February-10-2015 in Healthcare Law

In a recent Supreme Court Judgment, Ms Justice Laffoy dismissed the appeal of Bridget Doyle, who died before the hearing of her appeal had been concluded, on the grounds that none of the heads of damages in her claim survived her death.

On 20 December 2013, the High Court had dismissed Ms Doyle’s claim against the Eye and Ear Hospital for alleged failure to obtain informed consent from her for an eye operation. Mrs Doyle claimed that she underwent surgery under general anaesthetic without any discussion of the prospects of success of the surgery and that she would not have undergone the surgery had she known the risks associated with it. During the case, the High Court allowed the action to be amended so that Mrs Doyle, could sue through her son Edward, due to her incapacity. However, the Court held that the hospital met the minimum requirement for disclosure of information to patients in elective surgery and her claim was dismissed.

An appeal lodged by Mrs Doyle on 31 January 2014 was given priority because Mrs Doyle was terminally ill. An original hearing date in June 2014 was subsequently adjourned to July. Unfortunately, Mrs Doyle died in the interim - her death was not related to her treatment in the Eye & Ear Hospital.

As Executor of her estate, Mrs Doyle’s son sought an Order from the Court to continue her Appeal. The matter was referred to the Supreme Court to determine the status of the Appeal and in particular whether the Court had any jurisdiction to adjudicate on the Appeal, having regard to the nature of Mrs Doyle’s cause of action and her claim against the hospital.

The Supreme Court considered Part II of the Civil Liability Act 1961 (“the 1961 Act”). In particular, Ms Justice Laffoy referred to Section 7 (1) and (2) of the Civil Liability Act 1961 which she advised undoubtedly confirmed that the appellant’s cause of action survived her death for the benefit of her estate. However, Ms Justice Laffoy held that Section 7(2) of the 1961 Act precluded the estate of the appellant from recovering damages for any pain or suffering or personal injury. Further, Ms Justice Laffoy said that the reality of this case was that the claim, as pleaded and as pursued in the High Court, whether founded on alleged negligence, breach of duty or trespass to the person, was in its entirety a claim for general damages for pain, suffering and personal injury. Therefore, there was nothing by way of remedy or relief left in the claim, whether for special damages or otherwise, for the court to adjudicate on or to remit to the High Court.

Ms Justice Laffoy rejected arguments that what was before the Supreme Court was not the original cause of the legal action but the High Court decision. Ms Justice Laffoy said that it was difficult to see any logic in that proposition particularly in the context of the 1961 Act stating a claim “damages for pain etc” shall not survive the death of the plaintiff and it cannot be the case that the original cause of action had emerged in the judgment of the High Court. Ms Justice Laffoy further said that if Mrs Doyle had survived, any decision on the appeal could only have been determined on the basis of the original cause of action.

While the Guidelines do impose quite significant duties on healthcare professionals, drivers themselves are subject to obligations to report their own conditions, to respond truthfully to a healthcare professional’s questions about their health status and the likely impact on their driving ability, to adhered to their prescribed medical treatment and to comply with the requirements of their licence.

The Supreme Court re-listed the matter to deal with the issue of costs as per the Order of the High Court. The Order of the High Court included an Order awarding the Defendant its costs of the proceedings against the Plaintiff, Mrs Doyle.

 

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